331.康德- -

Reader86

What Is Enlightenment?
Immanuel Kant 1

1Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed nonage. Nonage is the inability to use one's own understanding without another's guidance. This nonage is self-imposed if its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in indecision and lack of courage to use one's own mind without another's guidance. Dare to know! (Sapere aude.) "Have the courage to use your own understanding," is therefore the motto of the enlightenment.

2Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why such a large part of mankind gladly remain minors all their lives, long after nature has freed them from external guidance. They are the reasons why it is so easy for others to set themselves up as guardians. It is so comfortable to be a minor. If I have a book that thinks for me, a pastor who acts as my conscience, a physician who prescribes my diet, and so on--then I have no need to exert myself. I have no need to think, if only I can pay; others will take care of that disagreeable business for me. Those guardians who have kindly taken supervision upon themselves see to it that the overwhelming majority of mankind--among them the entire fair sex--should consider the step to maturity, not only as hard, but as extremely dangerous. First, these guardians make their domestic cattle stupid and carefully prevent the docile creatures from taking a single step without the leading-strings to which they have fastened them. Then they show them the danger that would threaten them if they should try to walk by themselves. Now this danger is really not very great; after stumbling a few times they would, at last, learn to walk. However, examples of such failures intimidate and generally discourage all further attempts.

3Thus it is very difficult for the individual to work himself out of the nonage which has become almost second nature to him. He has even grown to like it, and is at first really incapable of using his own understanding because he has never been permitted to try it. Dogmas and formulas, these mechanical tools designed for reasonable use--or rather abuse--of his natural gifts, are the fetters of an everlasting nonage. The man who casts them off would make an uncertain leap over the narrowest ditch, because he is not used to such free movement. That is why there are only a few men who walk firmly, and who have emerged from nonage by cultivating their own minds.

4It is more nearly possible, however, for the public to enlighten itself; indeed, if it is only given freedom, enlightenment is almost inevitable. There will always be a few independent thinkers, even among the self-appointed guardians of the multitude. Once such men have thrown off the yoke of nonage, they will spread about them the spirit of a reasonable appreciation of man's value and of his duty to think for himself. It is especially to be noted that the public which was earlier brought under the yoke by these men afterwards forces these very guardians to remain in submission, if it is so incited by some of its guardians who are themselves incapable of any enlightenment. That shows how pernicious it is to implant prejudices: they will eventually revenge themselves upon their authors or their authors' descendants. Therefore, a public can achieve enlightenment only slowly. A revolution may bring about the end of a personal despotism or of avaricious tyrannical oppression, but never a true reform of modes of thought. New prejudices will serve, in place of the old, as guide lines for the unthinking multitude.

5This enlightenment requires nothing but freedom--and the most innocent of all that may be called "freedom": freedom to make public use of one's reason in all matters. Now I hear the cry from all sides: "Do not argue!" The officer says: "Do not argue--drill!" The tax collector: "Do not argue--pay!" The pastor: "Do not argue--believe!" Only one ruler in the world says: "Argue as much as you please, but obey!" We find restrictions on freedom everywhere. But which restriction is harmful to enlightenment? Which restriction is innocent, and which advances enlightenment? I reply: the public use of one's reason must be free at all times, and this alone can bring enlightenment to mankind.

Reader86

什么是启蒙？
伊曼纽尔·康德 1

1启蒙是人从自我强加的未成年人中走出来。 不成熟是指在没有他人指导的情况下无法运用自己的理解力。 如果这种非年龄的原因不是缺乏理解，而是因为犹豫不决和缺乏在没有他人指导的情况下运用自己的思想的勇气，那么这种非年龄就是自我强加的。 敢于知道！ （Sapere aude。）因此，“有勇气运用自己的理解”是启蒙运动的座右铭。

2懒惰和胆怯是为什么如此多的人在大自然将他们从外部指导中解放出来很久之后仍然乐意终生保持未成年人的原因。 这就是为什么其他人很容易将自己定位为监护人的原因。 当个未成年人真是太舒服了。 如果我有一本为我思考的书，有一位充当我良心的牧师，有一位为我开饮食处方的医生，等等，那么我就不需要费力了。 我不用想，只要我能付钱； 其他人会帮我处理那些不愉快的事情。 那些善意地对自己进行监督的监护人认为，绝大多数人类——其中包括所有女性——应该认为走向成熟的步骤不仅是艰难的，而且是极其危险的。 首先，这些守护者让他们的家畜变得愚蠢，并小心翼翼地阻止这些温顺的动物在没有拴着绳子的情况下迈出一步。 然后他们向他们展示，如果他们尝试自己走路，就会面临危险。 现在这个危险确实不是很大； 跌倒几次后，他们终于学会走路了。 然而，此类失败的例子会吓倒并通常阻碍所有进一步的尝试。

3因此，对于个人来说，要摆脱几乎已成为他第二天性的未成年人是非常困难的。 他甚至开始喜欢它，并且一开始真的无法使用自己的理解，因为他从未被允许尝试。 教条和公式，这些为合理使用——或者更确切地说，滥用——他的天赋而设计的机械工具，是永恒的束缚。 扔掉它们的人会在最狭窄的沟渠上进行不确定的跳跃，因为他不习惯这种自由的运动。 因此，行走坚定、自幼修心而出身的人寥寥无几。

4然而，公众更有可能自我启发。 事实上，如果只给予自由，启蒙几乎是不可避免的。 总会有一些独立的思想家，即使是在自封的大众守护者之中。 一旦这些人摆脱了未成年人的束缚，他们就会在他们周围传播对人的价值和独立思考的责任进行合理评价的精神。 特别值得注意的是，早些时候被这些人置于枷锁之下的公众后来又迫使这些监护人继续屈服，如果公众是受到一些本身没有任何启蒙能力的监护人的煽动的话。 这表明植入偏见是多么有害：他们最终会向其作者或其作者的后代进行报复。 因此，公众只能慢慢地获得启蒙。 革命可能会结束个人专制或贪婪的暴虐压迫，但永远不会带来思想模式的真正改革。 新的偏见将取代旧的偏见，成为不加思考的大众的指导方针。

5这种启蒙只需要自由——而且是所有可称为“自由”中最纯真的自由：在所有事务中公开运用自己的理性的自由。 现在我听到四面八方的呼声：“不要争论！” 军官说：“不要争论——演习！” 税吏：“别争论——交钱吧！” 牧师：“不要争论——相信！” 世界上只有一位统治者说：“你可以争论，但是要服从！” 我们到处都发现对自由的限制。 但哪种限制对启蒙有害呢？ 哪些限制是无害的，哪些限制可以促进启蒙？ 我答：公共理性的运用在任何时候都必须是自由的，只有这样才能给人类带来启蒙。

Reader86

6On the other hand, the private use of reason may frequently be narrowly restricted without especially hindering the progress of enlightenment. By "public use of one's reason" I mean that use which a man, as scholar, makes of it before the reading public. I call "private use" that use which a man makes of his reason in a civic post that has been entrusted to him. In some affairs affecting the interest of the community a certain [governmental] mechanism is necessary in which some members of the community remain passive. This creates an artificial unanimity which will serve the fulfillment of public objectives, or at least keep these objectives from being destroyed. Here arguing is not permitted: one must obey. Insofar as a part of this machine considers himself at the same time a member of a universal community--a world society of citizens--(let us say that he thinks of himself as a scholar rationally addressing his public through his writings) he may indeed argue, and the affairs with which he is associated in part as a passive member will not suffer. Thus it would be very unfortunate if an officer on duty and under orders from his superiors should want to criticize the appropriateness or utility of his orders. He must obey. But as a scholar he could not rightfully be prevented from taking notice of the mistakes in the military service and from submitting his views to his public for its judgment. The citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes levied upon him; indeed, impertinent censure of such taxes could be punished as a scandal that might cause general disobedience. Nevertheless, this man does not violate the duties of a citizen if, as a scholar, he publicly expresses his objections to the impropriety or possible injustice of such levies. A pastor, too, is bound to preach to his congregation in accord with the doctrines of the church which he serves, for he was ordained on that condition. But as a scholar he has full freedom, indeed the obligation, to communicate to his public all his carefully examined and constructive thoughts concerning errors in that doctrine and his proposals concerning improvement of religious dogma and church institutions. This is nothing that could burden his conscience. For what he teaches in pursuance of his office as representative of the church, he represents as something which he is not free to teach as he sees it. He speaks as one who is employed to speak in the name and under the orders of another. He will say: "Our church teaches this or that; these are the proofs which it employs." Thus he will benefit his congregation as much as possible by presenting doctrines to which he may not subscribe with full conviction. He can commit himself to teach them because it is not completely impossible that they may contain hidden truth. In any event, he has found nothing in the doctrines that contradicts the heart of religion. For if he believed that such contradictions existed he would not be able to administer his office with a clear conscience. He would have to resign it. Therefore the use which a scholar makes of his reason before the congregation that employs him is only a private use, for no matter how sizable, this is only a domestic audience. In view of this he, as preacher, is not free and ought not to be free, since he is carrying out the orders of others. On the other hand, as the scholar who speaks to his own public (the world) through his writings, the minister in the public use of his reason enjoys unlimited freedom to use his own reason and to speak for himself. That the spiritual guardians of the people should themselves be treated as minors is an absurdity which would result in perpetuating absurdities.

6另一方面，理性的私人运用可能经常受到狭隘的限制，而不会特别阻碍启蒙的进步。 我所说的“公开使用一个人的理性”是指一个人作为学者在读者面前对理性的使用。 我将“私人使用”称为“私人使用”，即一个人在委托给他的公民职位中对其理性的使用。 在一些影响社会利益的事务中，需要一定的机制，而社会的一些成员却处于被动的状态。 这创造了一种人为的一致，这将有助于实现公共目标，或者至少防止这些目标被破坏。 这里不允许争论：必须服从。 只要这个机器的一部分同时认为自己是一个普遍共同体的成员——一个由公民组成的世界社会——（让我们说，他认为自己是一位学者，通过他的著作理性地向公众发表讲话），他可能 事实上，他作为被动成员所参与的事务不会受到影响。 因此，如果一名执行上级命令的值班军官想要批评他的命令的适当性或实用性，那将是非常不幸的。 他必须服从。 但作为一名学者，不能阻止他注意到兵役中的错误，并向公众提交他的观点以供其判断。 公民不得拒绝缴纳对其征收的税款； 事实上，对此类税收的无礼谴责可能会被视为丑闻而受到惩罚，并可能引起普遍的不服从。 然而，如果这个人作为一名学者公开表示反对这种征税的不当或可能的不公正，那么他并不违反公民的义务。 牧师也有义务按照他所服务的教会的教义向他的会众讲道，因为他是在这个条件下被任命的。 但作为一名学者，他有充分的自由，实际上有义务，向公众传达他对教义中的错误的所有经过仔细审查和建设性的想法以及他有关改进宗教教条和教会机构的建议。 这不是什么能让他良心负担的事情。 因为他作为教会代表履行职责时所教导的内容，在他看来是不能自由教导的。 他就像一个受雇以他人的名义并在他人的命令下说话的人一样说话。 他会说：“我们的教会教导这个或那个；这些就是它所使用的证据。” 因此，他将通过提出他可能并不完全相信的教义来尽可能地使他的会众受益。 他可以致力于教导它们，因为它们并非完全不可能包含隐藏的真理。 无论如何，他在教义中没有发现任何与宗教核心相矛盾的内容。 因为如果他相信存在这样的矛盾，他就无法问心无愧地履行自己的职责。 他将不得不辞职。 因此，一个学者在雇用他的会众面前运用他的理性只是一种私人用途，因为无论规模有多大，这只是国内观众。 由此看来，作为传教士，他并不自由，也不应该自由，因为他是在执行别人的命令。 另一方面，作为通过著作向自己的公众（世界）说话的学者，公共使用理性的牧师享有使用自己的理性并为自己说话的无限自由。 把人民的精神守护者本身当作未成年人来对待，这是荒谬的，而且会导致永远的荒谬。

Reader86

7But should a society of ministers, say a Church Council, . . . have the right to commit itself by oath to a certain unalterable doctrine, in order to secure perpetual guardianship over all its members and through them over the people? I say that this is quite impossible. Such a contract, concluded to keep all further enlightenment from humanity, is simply null and void even if it should be confirmed by the sovereign power, by parliaments, and the most solemn treaties. An epoch cannot conclude a pact that will commit succeeding ages, prevent them from increasing their significant insights, purging themselves of errors, and generally progressing in enlightenment. That would be a crime against human nature whose proper destiny lies precisely in such progress. Therefore, succeeding ages are fully entitled to repudiate such decisions as unauthorized and outrageous. The touchstone of all those decisions that may be made into law for a people lies in this question: Could a people impose such a law upon itself? Now it might be possible to introduce a certain order for a definite short period of time in expectation of better order. But, while this provisional order continues, each citizen (above all, each pastor acting as a scholar) should be left free to publish his criticisms of the faults of existing institutions. This should continue until public understanding of these matters has gone so far that, by uniting the voices of many (although not necessarily all) scholars, reform proposals could be brought before the sovereign to protect those congregations which had decided according to their best lights upon an altered religious order, without, however, hindering those who want to remain true to the old institutions. But to agree to a perpetual religious constitution which is not publicly questioned by anyone would be, as it were, to annihilate a period of time in the progress of man's improvement. This must be absolutely forbidden.

8A man may postpone his own enlightenment, but only for a limited period of time. And to give up enlightenment altogether, either for oneself or one's descendants, is to violate and to trample upon the sacred rights of man. What a people may not decide for itself may even less be decided for it by a monarch, for his reputation as a ruler consists precisely in the way in which he unites the will of the whole people within his own. If he only sees to it that all true or supposed [religious] improvement remains in step with the civic order, he can for the rest leave his subjects alone to do what they find necessary for the salvation of their souls. Salvation is none of his business; it is his business to prevent one man from forcibly keeping another from determining and promoting his salvation to the best of his ability. Indeed, it would be prejudicial to his majesty if he meddled in these matters and supervised the writings in which his subjects seek to bring their [religious] views into the open, even when he does this from his own highest insight, because then he exposes himself to the reproach: Caesar non est supra grammaticos. 2    It is worse when he debases his sovereign power so far as to support the spiritual despotism of a few tyrants in his state over the rest of his subjects.

9When we ask, Are we now living in an enlightened age? the answer is, No, but we live in an age of enlightenment. As matters now stand it is still far from true that men are already capable of using their own reason in religious matters confidently and correctly without external guidance. Still, we have some obvious indications that the field of working toward the goal [of religious truth] is now opened. What is more, the hindrances against general enlightenment or the emergence from self-imposed nonage are gradually diminishing. In this respect this is the age of the enlightenment and the century of Frederick [the Great].

7但如果一个牧师协会，比如教会理事会，…… 。 。 是否有权宣誓遵守某种不可改变的信条，以确保对其所有成员并通过他们对人民的永久监护？ 我说这是完全不可能的。 这样一个旨在阻止人类进一步启蒙的契约，即使得到主权国家、议会和最庄严的条约的确认，也是无效的。 一个时代不可能缔结一项协议，该协议将承诺随后的时代，阻止他们增加重要的见解，清除自己的错误，并在启蒙方面普遍进步。 这将是对人性的犯罪，人性的正确命运正是在于这种进步。 因此，后世完全有理由否认这种未经授权和令人愤慨的决定。 所有可能成为人民法律的决定的试金石都在于这个问题：一个人民能否将这样的法律强加于自己？ 现在，有可能在一定的短时间内引入某种秩序，以期获得更好的秩序。 但是，在这一临时命令继续存在的同时，每个公民（首先是每个作为学者的牧师）都应该可以自由地发表对现有机构缺陷的批评。 这种情况应该持续下去，直到公众对这些问题的理解达到如此程度，通过联合许多（尽管不一定是全部）学者的声音，改革提案可以提交给主权者，以保护那些根据自己的最佳看法做出决定的会众。 改变的宗教秩序，然而，不妨碍那些想要忠于旧制度的人。 但是，同意一项不受任何人公开质疑的永久宗教宪法，可以说是抹杀了人类进步的一段时期。 这是必须绝对禁止的。

8一个人可以推迟自己的启蒙，但只能推迟一段有限的时间。 完全放弃启蒙，无论是为了自己还是为了子孙后代，都是对人类神圣权利的侵犯和践踏。 人民自己不能决定的事情更不可能由君主决定，因为他作为统治者的声誉正是在于他将全体人民的意志团结在他自己的意志之中。 如果他只确保所有真正的或假定的[宗教]进步与公民秩序保持一致，那么他就可以让他的臣民独自去做他们认为拯救灵魂所必需的事情。 拯救与他无关； 他的职责是防止一个人强行阻止另一个人尽其所能决定和促进他的救赎。 事实上，如果他插手这些事务并监督他的臣民试图公开他们的[宗教]观点的著作，那么即使他是出于自己的最高洞察力这样做，也会对国王陛下造成损害，因为这样他就暴露了 他自己也受到了责备：凯撒不是语法上的。 2 更糟糕的是，他贬低自己的主权，以支持其国家中少数暴君对其他臣民的精神专制。

9当我们问：我们现在生活在一个启蒙时代吗？ 答案是：不，但我们生活在一个启蒙时代。 就目前的情况来看，人们已经能够在没有外部指导的情况下自信而正确地在宗教事务中运用自己的理性，这还远非事实。 尽管如此，我们还是有一些明显的迹象表明，朝着[宗教真理]目标努力的领域现已开放。 更重要的是，阻碍普遍启蒙或摆脱自我强加的未成年人的障碍正在逐渐减少。 从这方面来说，这是启蒙时代和腓特烈大帝的世纪。

Reader86

10A prince ought not to deem it beneath his dignity to state that he considers it his duty not to dictate anything to his subjects in religious matters, but to leave them complete freedom. If he repudiates the arrogant word "tolerant", he is himself enlightened; he deserves to be praised by a grateful world and posterity as that man who was the first to liberate mankind from dependence, at least on the government, and let everybody use his own reason in matters of conscience. Under his reign, honorable pastors, acting as scholars and regardless of the duties of their office, can freely and openly publish their ideas to the world for inspection, although they deviate here and there from accepted doctrine. This is even more true of every person not restrained by any oath of office. This spirit of freedom is spreading beyond the boundaries [of Prussia] even where it has to struggle against the external hindrances established by a government that fails to grasp its true interest. [Frederick's Prussia] is a shining example that freedom need not cause the least worry concerning public order or the unity of the community. When one does not deliberately attempt to keep men in barbarism, they will gradually work out of that condition by themselves.

11I have emphasized the main point of the enlightenment--man's emergence from his self-imposed nonage--primarily in religious matters, because our rulers have no interest in playing the guardian to their subjects in the arts and sciences. Above all, nonage in religion is not only the most harmful but the most dishonorable. But the disposition of a sovereign ruler who favors freedom in the arts and sciences goes even further: he knows that there is no danger in permitting his subjects to make public use of their reason and to publish their ideas concerning a better constitution, as well as candid criticism of existing basic laws. We already have a striking example [of such freedom], and no monarch can match the one whom we venerate.

12But only the man who is himself enlightened, who is not afraid of shadows, and who commands at the same time a well disciplined and numerous army as guarantor of public peace--only he can say what [the sovereign of] a free state cannot dare to say: "Argue as much as you like, and about what you like, but obey!" Thus we observe here as elsewhere in human affairs, in which almost everything is paradoxical, a surprising and unexpected course of events: a large degree of civic freedom appears to be of advantage to the intellectual freedom of the people, yet at the same time it establishes insurmountable barriers. A lesser degree of civic freedom, however, creates room to let that free spirit expand to the limits of its capacity. Nature, then, has carefully cultivated the seed within the hard core--namely the urge for and the vocation of free thought. And this free thought gradually reacts back on the modes of thought of the people, and men become more and more capable of acting in freedom. At last free thought acts even on the fundamentals of government and the state finds it agreeable to treat man, who is now more than a machine, in accord with his dignity.

Notes

1. Translated by Mary C. Smith.

2. [Caesar is not above grammarians.]

10一位君主不应该认为，他认为自己有责任在宗教事务上不向臣民发号施令，而是给予他们完全的自由，这有损他的尊严。 如果他否定了“宽容”这个傲慢的词，那么他自己就是开悟的； 他值得感恩的世界和子孙后代称赞他是第一个将人类从依赖（至少是对政府）中解放出来的人，并让每个人在良心问题上运用自己的理性。 在他的统治下，可敬的牧师们以学者的身份，无论其职责如何，都可以自由、公开地向世界发表他们的思想以供检验，尽管他们的思想有时与公认的教义有偏差。 对于每个不受任何就职宣誓约束的人来说更是如此。 这种自由精神正在蔓延到[普鲁士]境外，甚至在普鲁士必须与未能把握其真正利益的政府所设置的外部障碍作斗争的地方。 [腓特烈的普鲁士]是一个光辉的例子，表明自由不必引起对公共秩序或社会团结的丝毫担忧。 当一个人不刻意地试图让人们处于野蛮状态时，他们会逐渐自己摆脱这种状态。

11我已经强调了启蒙运动的要点——人类从自我强加的未成年人中脱颖而出——主要是在宗教问题上，因为我们的统治者没有兴趣在艺术和科学领域扮演他们臣民的监护人。 最重要的是，宗教中的未成年人不仅是最有害的，而且是最不光彩的。 但是，一个支持艺术和科学自由的主权统治者的倾向甚至更进一步：他知道允许他的臣民公开运用他们的理性并发表他们关于更好的宪法的想法并没有危险。 对现行基本法的坦率批评。 我们已经有了一个[这种自由]的显着例子，没有一位君主可以与我们所崇敬的君主相媲美。

12但只有自己开明、不惧怕阴影、同时指挥一支纪律严明、人数众多的军队作为公共和平的保障者——只有他才能说出自由国家[主权者]所不能说的话。 敢于说：“想争论多少就争论多少，爱争论什么就争论什么，但是要服从！” 因此，我们在这里和其他地方的人类事务中观察到，几乎一切都是自相矛盾的，是令人惊讶和意想不到的事件进程：很大程度的公民自由似乎有利于人民的知识自由，但同时它也有利于人民的知识自由。 设立了难以逾越的障碍。 然而，较低程度的公民自由却创造了空间，让自由精神扩展到其能力的极限。 那么，大自然在其核心中精心培育了种子——即对自由思想的渴望和使命。 这种自由的思想逐渐反作用于人们的思维方式，人们变得越来越有能力自由行动。 最后，自由思想甚至影响到政府的基本原则，国家发现可以根据人的尊严来对待人，因为人现在已经不仅仅是一台机器了。

笔记

1. 玛丽·C·史密斯译。

2. [凯撒并不凌驾于语法学家之上。]

Reader86

http://www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html